The rhetorical tradition is not homogeneous or monolithic, nor does it provide a complete account of human communicative praxis. Indeed, Western rhetorical theory exhibits both continuities and discontinuities, well-surveyed territory and blank spots on the map of discourse. However, in an initial survey of the field, it is particularly useful to follow the trails of several traditional issues or arguments that together outline a common ground of rhetorical concerns. Such consistent lines of inquiry help orient us to texts reflecting different historical, cultural, and intellectual contexts. Further, they help us raise interpretive questions that address central concerns of rhetorical theory. They may also help us to construct our own historical narratives about the continuities and discontinuities, emphases and oversights, of Western rhetorical theory, narratives that ineluctably reveal our own theoretical, ideological, and practical concerns and inform our contributions to the field.
How does each theorist view previous rhetorical theory, how identify what needs to be extended, challenged, modified, or added?
Rhetorical treatises often provide, early on, a brief history of previous rhetorical theory, using that narrative to establish the need for their own work. Thus, Aristotle insists that "previous compilers of 'Arts' of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art" (Rhetoric 1354a). Similarly, Plato speaks of earlier rhetoricians "who have imagined that it is rhetoric they have discovered when they have attained merely to the preliminaries necessary to the art" (Phaedrus St. 269). More than two millennia later, George Campbell wrote that "The observations and rules transmitted to us from these distinguished names in the learned world, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, have been for the most part only translated by later critics, or put into a modish dress and new arrangement"; he then proposed a study of the foundations of rhetorical skill in human nature, a study which, according to him, "adds both weight and evidence to all precedent discoveries and rules" (Philosophy of Rhetoric li). Such historical narratives reveal much about the concerns informing a given rhetorical theory and about the importance of a sense of history in any intellectual or cultural endeavor.
Is rhetoric, as it is conceived or practiced by particular rhetoricians and rhetors, inherently ethical or unethical? How does it embody or enact ethical values?
Rhetoricians and philosophers have for 2,500 years weighed the dangers of an art of persuasion in the hands of ignorant or malicious persons against the benefits of such an art in the hands of advocates for the true and the good (as defined by those rhetoricians and philosophers, of course). Plato has Dame Rhetoric proclaim, "Remember that I bring no compulsion to learn the art of speech on anyone who is ignorant of the truth; indeed, if my advice is worth anything, a man should not resort to me until he has learned the truth. Yet this boast I can make: without me even the man who is thoroughly familiar with the facts will be not a bit nearer to the art of persuasion" (Phaedrus St. 260). Aristotle, arguing that the art of rhetoric is itself neutral, writes, "If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue…for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm" (Rhetoric 1355b). But the debate did not end there. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant wrote, "the art of the orator (ars oratoria), the art of availing oneself of the weaknesses of men for one's own designs (whether these be well meant or even actually good does not matter), is worthy of no respect" (Critique of the Judgment 172n50). Richard Weaver states the ethical question of rhetoric succinctly, "if truth alone is not sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately added?" ("The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric" 15).
The Utility of Arts of Rhetoric
Regardless of its ethical status, what can rhetoric accomplish?
As the following examples illustrate, it is sometimes difficult (not to mention dangerous) to separate utility from ethical values-however useful for the sake of analysis. Speaking of eloquence, one of the interlocutors in Cicero's De Oratore asks, "what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens [Cicero's cultural gender bias glares forth here], or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights?" (1.8.33). Speaking more technically, Cicero writes in another treatise that "The man of eloquence whom we seek…will be one who is able to speak in court or in deliberative bodies so as to prove, to please and to sway or persuade" (Orator xxi; emphasis added). But Aristotle provides perhaps the most famous functional definition of rhetoric: "Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to an subject whatever" (Rhetoric 1355b). In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon associated the means of persuasion with the faculties of mind, arguing that "the office and use of this art is but to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to the imagination, in order to excite the affections and will" (Advancement of Learning 177). Also focusing on the faculties of the mind, George Campbell defined rhetoric as "That art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end"-those ends being "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will" (Philosophy of Rhetoric 1). In our own century, Richard Weaver returns to a more overtly value-laden explanation of rhetoric's utility: "So rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend and only the soul have affection for" ("The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric" 25).
The Realm of Rhetoric I: Arts and Sciences of Knowing, Making, and Doing
How might rhetoric be related to other arts and sciences and to their aims and objects of study?
The realm of rhetoric has been redefined many times in the course of its history, sometimes ceding territory to other arts, sometimes operating in a federation with closely related arts, and occasionally annexing other arts and sciences entirely. Again, the earliest surveys of the realm of rhetoric appear in Classical texts. Plato refused to grant rhetoric-as it was practiced in Athens-the status of a true art, calling it instead a "knack" and, more specifically, "a branch of flattery." He explains his position in a long comparison to other arts: "So, as I say, the flattery of cooking has taken the guise of medicine; and the pretence of gymnastics has been assumed in this same way by the flattery of make-up, a thing evil and deceitful, ignoble and illiberal, performing its deceptions by means of forms and colors, polish and fine garments, assuming a borrowed beauty to the neglect of natural loveliness which comes only through gymnastics. Well, not to make too long a tale of it, I'll put it in geometrical form…: as make-up is to gymnastics, so is sophistic to legislation; and as cookery to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice" (Gorgias St. 465).
Aristotle's Rhetoric opens with the claim that "Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic" (1354a)-a distinction that has occasioned much comment and about which we will have much to say in class. Later in the Rhetoric, Aristotle elaborates on this distinction: "Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may reasonably called Politics. That is why Rhetoric assumes the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments" (1356a). Even without knowing Aristotle's definition of dialectic, we can see that he is concerned about blurred distinctions between the arts and sciences that may lead to errors in judging claims argued in the context of those arts and sciences.
In the 1980s, a similar concern has lead to a considerable body of work investigating "rhetoric in the human sciences," a movement based on the assumption that "what for so long were considered issues in philosophy or science might more profitable be addressed as issues in rhetoric. . . . The project-variously known as 'rhetoric of inquiry' or as 'rhetoric of science'-is taking place against a backdrop of rising dissatisfaction with objectivist credos" (Herbert Simons, Rhetoric in the Human Sciences). Indeed, James Boyd White, a scholar associated with rhetoric of inquiry, suggests that "Rhetoric may also provide a set of questions and attitudes that will enable us to move from one academic field to another and in so doing to unite them.…Rhetoric in the highly expanded sense in which I speak of it might even become the central discipline for which we have been looking for so long-which 'science' has proven not to be-by which the others can be defined and organized and judged" (qtd. in Simons).
The Realm of Rhetoric II: The Cultural Forms and Forums of Discourse
Whose discourse and what occasions for discourse are highlighted or valued by different theories of rhetoric? Whose discourse and what occasions are ignored or devalued?
Rhetorical theories typically reflect characteristics of the forums of discourse most valued by the cultures in which they arise. Thus, rhetorical theory may emphasize the problems addressed by those forums, the persons privileged to address or judge arguments presented in those forums, the sorts of arguments given the most credence in those forums, the linguistic conventions of such forums, and the role of such forums in the larger culture. Most Greek and Roman rhetorical theory assumes that rhetoric is practiced in three forums: the senate or governing body of the state, the law courts, and the public assembly. After the establishment of Christianity, the pulpit became an very important forum for discourse, one that required reconception of the art of rhetoric. And such reconception of rhetoric in response to cultural forces continues in our day, as we can see in the preface to one of our texts, The Rhetorical Tradition: "We also include work that enlarges the definition of what can be construed as rhetorical theory, such as women's defenses of their right to speak in a public forum and the incipient study of black English from a rhetorical perspective. By including such work in a volume that has the seemingly monolithic title of The Rhetorical Tradition, we hope to suggest that although there is indeed a tradition that scholars will benefit from sharing, it cannot be regarded as fixed and never-changing. Any 'tradition' will include multiple voices, though at any given moment some voices will be louder than others" (vi).
If rhetoric can be constituted as an art of discourse, what are its constituent principles or doctrines?
Throughout its history, rhetoricians have produced innumerable taxonomies of rhetorical principles. Indeed, Samuel Butler captured in a couplet what every student of rhetoric-and most of its critics-have felt at one time or another: "For all a rhetorician's rules / Teach nothing but to name his tools" (Hudibras, lines 89-90). Though sometimes overdone, taxonomies or "grammars" of rhetoric provide necessary analytical principles for the study of discourse. The most ancient and basic division of rhetoric identified five "canons"-invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery-each of which was subdivided into other clusters of key concepts. For the student of rhetorical history, such taxonomies provide one means of following the relationships among rhetorical theories in different periods, for traditional taxonomies have often been employed-and redefined-by later theorists.
How does the conception of rhetoric in a given period reflect larger cultural and intellectual forms and movements?
This line of inquiry parallels the study of how rhetoricians place their own work in the rhetorical tradition, but it takes a broader view, focusing on connections among conceptions of rhetoric and cultural forces. Such studies have attempted to identify distinguishing characteristics of the most representative rhetorics in a given historical period, often according to their "grammatical" focus or relative emphasis on one element of rhetorical situations-speaker, listener, message, or medium. If we think of those elements as "characters" in a narrative, we can imagine them struggling for dominance over one another-the "plot" of rhetorical history, as it were. Such plot summaries always oversimplify the rich diversity of rhetorical theory, but if used with caution, they can help us reflect on the character of rhetorical theory in a given period.
Douglas Ehninger, for instance, devised the following synoptic overview of rhetorical history in "Colloquy: A Synoptic View of Systems of Western Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975): 448- 53.
Period |
Orientation |
Grammatical Focus |
|---|---|---|
| Classical | pragmatic | message |
| Renaissance | aesthetic | medium |
| 18th Century | psychological | listener |
| Modern | social | medium |
We will consider some other "plot summaries"—and perhaps devise a few of our own—in the course of our discussions.
The Training and Character of the Rhetor
Can rhetorical skill be taught? How and to whom should it be taught? What conception of the "ideal orator" informs a given rhetorical pedagogy?
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what constitutes rhetorical skill (a question we will address in other lines of inquiry), we must still consider how such skills might best be taught. Classical rhetorical again provides an enduring conceptual model for this issue. Isocrates, whom George Kennedy credits with making "rhetoric the permanent basis of the educational system of the Greek and the Roman world and thus of many later centuries as well," defined the problem in this way: "I say to [prospective pupils] that if they are to excel in oratory or in managing affairs or in any line of work, they must, first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practised in the use and application of their art" (Antidosis 186-188; emphasis added). Nature, art, and practice. Of course, since Isocrates there has been no end of controversy concerning how to determine a student's "natural ability," to establish the principles of an art of discourse, or to decide which instances of communicative practice students should study and emulate.
Rhetoricians have also argued about the relative emphasis to place on these three pedagogical practices. A review of John Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory (1758) takes a typical eighteenth-century stand, arguing that familiarity with the speeches of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Cicero will produce "a genius for oratory" by virtue of the student's "natural perception and common sense" far more readily than any "didactic treatise on the subject." Indeed, another review claims that overemphasis on the rules of oratory can harm the pupil: "strong and vigorous emotions…can be no where taught, but they may be extinguished by rule." Nevertheless, such commentators typically allow for Alexander Pope's claim that "Those RULES of old discover'd, not devis'd, / Are Nature still, but Nature Methodiz'd" ("Essay on Criticism"). For instance, a review of Thomas Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution admits that the orator cannot merely rely on feeling, yet maintains that his "method must not be contrary to, but an improvement upon nature."
In our own time, teachers of writing have argued that students learn to write primarily by writing, not by reading great works of literature (though much current scholarship in composition is now investigating the relationships between reading and writing rather than treating them as opposing pedagogical strategies). Further, study of the writing process has placed greater emphasis on practice than on precept (particularly grammatical precepts) in writing classrooms. Finally, much socially-oriented research has attempted to broaden the scope of writing in the classroom so that students will better understand the "use and application" of written communication in their culture.
Transformations of Language: Orality, Literacy, Technology
What is the relationship between rhetorical theory and practice and the available media of communication?
Just as rhetorical theory reflects the cultural forums of discourse in a given historical setting, so it reflect the technologies of communication. As writing began to assume greater importance in Greek culture, Plato included the following lament in the Phaedrus:
Writing, you know, Phaedrus, has this strange quality about it, which makes it really like painting: the painter's products stand before us quite as though they were alive; but if you question them, they maintain a solemn silence. So, too, with written words: you might think they spoke as though they made sense, but if you ask them anything about what they are saying, if you wish an explanation, they go on telling you the same thing, over and over forever. Once a thing is put in writing, it rolls about all over the place, falling into the hands of those who have no concern with it just as easily as under the notice of those who comprehend; it has no notion of whom to address or whom to avoid. And when it is ill-treated or abused as illegitimate, it always needs its father to help it, being quite unable to protect or help itself. (St. 275)
Even printing, which seems so clear a benefit to literate culture, evinced some worries among philosophers. The following are the reflections of an eighteenth-century Scotsman:
Learning has without doubt spread itself far & wide through the means of printing. From the press a torrent of light hath issued; but its wide diffusion hath diminished its radiance. A smatterer is now as common a creature as a dunce was formerly; but the real man of letters is more rarely to be met with.…But there is a worse grievance still behind. Printing has made every man set up for a reasoner, a virtuoso, or politician. The country villages & the manufactory houses have not been more thinned by the army & the ostentation of livery servants than by books. Every head teems with fine thoughts & grand ideas of a literary profession, casting over the mechanic arts & low offices upon others or executing them with a grudge. Newes papers, magazines & reviews come into the hands of every shop-keepers apprentice & fill his head with indigested scraps of learning at a very cheap rate. (Thomas Gordon, AUL MS 3107/3/5).
Such elitist notions seem quite foreign to us at first glance, until we recall the difficulty we have had adjusting to "video literacy" in the twentieth century. Many people criticize television news broadcasts on grounds that seem very similar to some of Thomas Gordon's concerns about "Newes papers, magazines & reviews." By contrast, many contemporary scholars have embraced the diversity of communication technology, convinced, as Marshall McLuhan suggested, that the medium is [at least part of] the message.
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