NEIL TENNANT
Humanities Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
tennant[dot]9[at]osu[dot]eduForthcoming and Recent Presentations
NEIL TENNANT
Humanities Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
tennant[dot]9[at]osu[dot]edu
Forthcoming and Recent Presentations
- 'Natural Foundations for Synthetic Projective Geometry, Midwest Workshop in Philosophy of Mathematics VIII, Notre Dame, October 2008
- 'Parts, Classes and Parts and Classes: An Anti-Realist Reading of Lewisian Mereology'. Accepted for presentation at the First Synthese Annual Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark: Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy. October 2007. To appear in Synthese. (Unable to attend conference, owing to unforeseen circumstances.)
- 'Rational Belief Revision', Department of Philosophy, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa, September 2007
- 'The History of the Explanatory Gap', Department of Philosophy, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburgh, South Africa, August 2007
- 'Inductive definitions, proofs by mathematical induction, and the foundations of mathematics', Logic Program, Indiana University, December 2006
- 'What might logic and methodology have offered the Dover School Board, had they been willing to listen?', 2005-2006 Thacher Lecture in Philosophy of Science and Logic, George Washington University, Washington DC, April 2006
- 'Natural Logicism', Midwest Workshop in Philosophy of Mathematics VI, Notre Dame, October 2005
- 'Intuitionistic Theory-Change', American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, April 2005
- 'The Gärdenfors Impossibility Theorem does not show that genuine belief-revision functions cannot be monotonic', Philosophy Colloquium, Princeton University, April 2005
- 'Minimal Mutilation', Association of Symbolic Logic, San Francisco, March 2005
- 'The Gärdenfors Impossibility Theorem does not show that genuine belief-revision functions cannot be monotonic', Association of Symbolic Logic, Atlanta, January 2005
- 'The Gärdenfors Impossibility Theorem does not show that genuine belief-revision functions cannot be monotonic', Lunchtime Colloquium, Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh, November 2004
- Workshop on 'Negation in constructive logic' at the Department of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, July 1-4, 2004, funded by the German Research Council (DFG)
- Arché Workshop on Tennant's Philosophy of Mathematics, at the University of St. Andrews, May 2004
- 'Abstraction operators', Philosophy Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, October 2003
- 'Abstraction operators', Philosophy Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, March 2003
- 'Abstraction Operators', Conference in Philosophy of Mathematics, St. Andrews, Scotland, August 2002.
- 'Content, Rules, Logic', NYU Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind and Language, March 2002.
- 'Computing Theory Contractions', Fourth In-House Conference, Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh, November 2001.
- 'Theory Contraction and the Staining Algorithm', Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Colorado at Boulder, October 2000.
- 'Conservativeness, Incompleteness and Deflationism', Philosophy Colloquium at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, November 1999.
- 'Deductive v. expressive power: a pre-Gödelian predicament'. Lunchtime Colloquium of Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, November 1999.
- 'Logicism, Molecularism and Conservative Extension', invited lecture to the joint session of the American Philosophical Association (Central Division) and the Association for Symbolic Logic, New Orleans, May 1999.
- 'Deductive myopia v. descriptive diplopia: a pre-Gödelian predicament'. Keynote Address to biennial Logic and Language Conference, London, April 1998.
- 'Does your language constrain your metaphysics?' APA Eastern division, Philadelphia, December 1997. Paper for Special Session arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation, chaired by Professor Hilary Putnam.
- 'Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy and the Rule-Following Paradox' (Reply to Scott Soames), Chapel Hill Philosophy Colloquium, 1995
- 'On Naive Set Theory' (Reply to Laurie Goldstein), American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Boston, 1994
- 'Cognitive Significance Regained', Colloquium on Formal Semantics, University of Cincinnati, September 1994
- 'Intuitionistic Relevant Logic and Proof Search', Research Seminar of Theoretical Computing Laboratory, University of Cambridge, July 1994.
- 'Cognitive Significance Regained', Workshop on Philosophy and Physics, St. Andrews, February 1994.
- 'Changing the Theory of Theory Change', Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, January 1994.
- 'Automated Deduction and Artificial Intelligence', International Wittgenstein Colloquium, Kirchberg, August 1993.