NEIL W. TENNANT
tennant.9@osu.edu
If you email me, please use the header PHIL 873: YOURNAME.
Professor
Department of Philosophy
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Winter Term 2008
PHIL 873: Inferentialism
Research Seminar Graduate students should note that this course can be used to satisfy a coursework distribution requirement either in LLS or in M&E. Prerequisites: introductory logic, and some experience with conceptual analysis and the theory of meaning. A useful link to research resources in Philosophy in the University Library Aims and Topics. Inferentialism is the view that inference is not only the central notion in logic and the theory of meaning (as opposed, say, to the notions of truth-conditions, or of theoremhood, or of logical truth); it is also the most primitive notion, one in terms of which all other logical and semantical notions should be defined. Among these are the notions of reference, truth under an interpretation, sentence-meaning, and validity of argument. The inferentialist places priority on patterns of inference and proof, and the role that inferring plays both in our acquisition of language and in our manifestation of our understanding of language. This course will examine and explore arguments both for and against inferentialism as an overarching doctrine in the theory of meaning (and of cognition and agency quite generally). We shall look into the historical roots of the modern form of the doctrine, beginning with early hints in Frege, passing through Carnap's use of consequence rules, and examining the first statement of the doctrine in earnest in the writings of Wilfred Sellars. More recently, Robert Brandom has articulated, developed and defended Sellars' inferentialism. Brandom's approach will be compared and contrasted with that of Michael Dummett. Dummett stresses the importance of inference and warrant in the theory of meaning, but he reaches radically reformist conclusions about logic as a result of that stress. Why does Dummett urge us to revise logic, while Brandom offers a quietist 'inferentialist' account of classical logic? Answering this question requires one to investigate some technicalities in modern proof theory, as it has been carried out by the likes of Gerhard Gentzen and Dag Prawitz. The student will be introduced to some of the sophisticated techniques from proof theory that can be of help in discussion of philosophically important questions. The time-honored problem of Arthur Prior's deviant connective 'tonk' will be examined in the light of these proof-theoretic methods. (Prior had intended 'tonk' to put an end to inferentialist attempts to characterize the meanings of logical connectives in purely inferential terms.) The instructor will also offer his own views on the prospects for a thorough-going inferentialism, beginning with his treatment, in 1987, of 'transitional atomic logic', and his analyses of phenomena such as relevance and paradoxes in inferential terms. We shall also examine the extent to which mathematical and foundational theories can be presented inferentially, rather than axiomatically in the traditional way. These include number theory, geometry, set theory and mereology.
This will be a course with a great deal of exploratory discussion. You will have the opportunity to express your own views and criticize the views of others.
Background reading (It will definitely not be assumed that you will have read these works by the beginning of term, or even that you will get round to reading them all in the course of the term! This list is provided for purposes of orientation only.)
Canonical Reading List Assessment:
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Policy on attendance at classes