

Replacing Truth

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Conventions

Single quotes are used to form the names of linguistic expressions; e.g., 'Kevin' is the name of Kevin.

Individual constants are in the same font as regular text; e.g., p is a sentence.

Corner quotes are used in conjunction with names for complex sentences; e.g., $[\sim p]$ is a name of the negation of p .

Schematic variables are in italics; e.g., the law of excluded middle is: p or $\sim p$.

Sentential variables are Ariel font; e.g., John believes that \mathbf{p} .

Angle brackets are used to form names in conjunction with sentential variables; e.g., $\langle \mathbf{p} \rangle$ is true iff \mathbf{p} .

Italics are used to specify meanings of linguistic expressions; e.g., 'beer' means *beer*.

Supposing *truth* is a woman – what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? That the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth so far have been awkward and very improper methods for winning a woman's heart?

—Nietzsche

Dude: Look, man, I've got certain information, all right? Certain things have come to light. And, you know, has it ever occurred to you, that, instead of, uh, you know, running around, uh, uh, blaming me, you know, given the nature of all this new shit, you know, I-I-I ... this could be a-a-a-a lot more, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, complex, I mean, it's not just, it might not be just such a simple ... uh, you know?

Lebowski: What in God's holy name are you blathering about?

Dude: I'll tell you what I'm blathering about ... I've got information man! New shit has come to light! And shit, man ... she *kidnapped herself*.

—The Big Lebowski