Address: Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210-1365, USA
Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology & Cognitive Science
Areas of Competence: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of BIology, Philosophy of Science
1998-2000: Research Associate/Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania
2001-2006: Lecturer, King’s College London.
2006-2007: Senior Lecturer, King’s College London.
2007-Present: Professor, The Ohio State University
Oct. 1998: Ph.D. in Philosophy. Rutgers University.
May 1997: Graduate Certificate in Cognitive Science. Rutgers University.
June 1992: M.Sc. (Distinction) in Artificial Intelligence. Sussex University.
June 1990: B.A. (1st Class Honours) in Philosophy. Leeds University.
Title: Massively Modular Minds: The Nature, Plausibility and Philosophical Implications of Evolutionary Psychology.
Committee: Jerry Fodor, Alan Leslie, Brian McLaughlin, Stephen Stich (Chair)
Book (in progress)
Samuels, R. Descartes’ Challenge: Flexibility and the Architecture of Cognition (Under contract with OUP)
Articles and Chapters
Samuels R. (1998) "How Scientific Is Folk Psychology?" (1998). American Journal of Psychology. Vol. 111, No. 1.
Samuels R. (1998) "Evolutionary Psychology and The Massive Modularity Hypothesis" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, 575-602.
Samuels R. (1998) "What Brains Won't Tell Us About the Mind: A Critique of the Neurobiological Argument against Representational Nativism". Mind and Language, 13, 4, 548-570.
Samuels R., S. Stich and P. Tremoulet (1999) "Rethinking Rationality: From Bleak Implications to Darwinian Modules". In E. Lepore and Z. Pylyshyn (eds.) What is Cognitive Science? Oxford: Blackwell.
Reprinted in: K. Korta, E. Sosa & X. Arrazola, eds., Cognition, Agency, and Rationality. Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science (ICCS-97), (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer) 1999. Pp. 21-62
Portuguese translation: “Repensando a Racionalidade: de Implicações Pessimistas a Módulos Darwinianos” in Intelectu, no. 9, Outubro de 2003. Available on line at: http://www.intelectu.com/
Samuels, R. (2000) “Massively Modular Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and Cognitive Architecture”. In P. Carruthers (ed.) Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Samuels, R. and S. Stich (2001) “Irrationality: Philosophical Perspectives”. In N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds.) The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier, Available online at: http://www.iesbs.com/
Samuels R., S. Stich and M. Bishop (2002) “Ending the Rationality Wars: How To Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear”. In R. Elio (ed.) Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 236-268.
Samuels R. (2002) "Nativism in Cognitive Science". Mind and Language, 17, 3, 233-265.
Samuels, R & Stich, S. (2002) “Rationality”, In The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, vol. 3 MacMillan Publishers. Pp. 830-837.
Samuels, R and Stich S. (2003) “Rationality and Psychology”. In A. Mele (ed.) Rationality Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series. New York: OUP. Pp. 279-300.
Samuels, R (2003) "The spatial reorientation data do not support the thesis that language is the medium of cross-modular thought". In Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 25, Issue 6 pp 697 – 698.
Samuels R., S. Stich, and L. Faucher (2004) "Reason and Rationality". In Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, & J. Wolenski Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Pp. 131-179.
Samuels, R. (2004) “Innateness and Cognitive Science”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol. 8 issue 3.
Samuels, R. (2005) "The complexity of cognition: tractability arguments for massive modularity". In Carruthers, P. Laurence, S. & Stich S. (eds.) The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. OUP. Pp. 107-121.
Samuels, R (2006) “Is the Mind Massively Modular?” In Stainton, R. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell.
Samuels, R. (2007) “Is innateness a confused notion?” In Carruthers, P. Laurence, S. & Stich S. (eds.) The Innate Mind: Foundations and the future, OUP.
Samuels, R. (2007) “Varieties of Dual-Process Theory for Probabilistic Reasoning”. In Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 30:280-281
Samuels, R. (2008) “Psychology” In Psillos S. and Curd M. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Routledge.
Samuels, R. (Forthcoming) “Nativism” In Symons, J. and Garzón F. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge
Samuels, R. (Forthcoming) “The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus: Comments on Dual Systems” In Evans, J. & Frankish, K. (eds.) In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond, OUP.
Samuels, R. (Forthcoming) “Delusions as a Natural Kind” In Broome, M. & Bortolotti, L. (eds.) Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives, OUP
Samuels, R. (Forthcoming) “Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Reviews, Critical Notices etc.
Review of P. Thagard's Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science (1997). Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 1 No. 4.
Review of M. Bekoff and C. Allen’s Species of Mind with G. Papura (2000). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
"Perspectives on Rationality" (2000) co-edited with M. Bishop and S. Stich special issue of Synthese.
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Forthcoming) co-edited with E. Margolis and S. Stich, OUP
"Modular Minds and the Evolutionary Analysis of Rationality" (with S. Stich) Fifth International Colloquium in Cognitive Science, San Sebastian, Summer 1997.
"What Brains Won't Tell Us About the Mind” Caltech, University of Delaware and University of Pennsylvania, Spring 1998.
“Ending The Rationality Wars” (with M. Bishop and S. Stich) Eleventh Annual Vancouver Cognitive Science Conference, Vancouver, B.C., February 1998.
“Rethinking Rationality” and “Ending the Rationality Wars” (with S. Stich) Sheffield University, Spring 1998.
“Innateness” King’s College London, May 1999.
“Nativism in Cognitive Science” ISHPPSB Conference, Oaxaca, Mexico (July 99), Sheffield University (July 99), Temple University (Nov. 99), Washington University (Feb. 00).
"Nativism and Neuroscience" Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, November 1999.
"Innate Ideas", invited lecture for Penn Humanities Forum seminar "Human Nature", November 1999.
"Theory-Formation, Modularity and the Ontogeny of Commonsense Psychology" Washington University, February 2000.
"The significance of neuroscience to philosophy", invited lecture for "National Brain Awareness Week" University of Pennsylvania, March 2000.
“Griffiths on the Innateness of Emotional Expressions”, Author Meets Critics Session, Eastern APA, New York, December 2000.
“Modularity, Representation and Inter-Modular Communication” Cognitive Science 2001 Conference, Edinburgh, August 2001
“Is Innateness a Fundamentally Confused Notion?” Workshop on Innateness and the Structure of the Mind, Sheffield University, November 2001.
“The Irrationality of Delusion”, King's College London, March 2002
“Descartes’ Challenge: Modularity, Language and the Flexibility of Human Cognition”, Innateness and the Structure of the Human Mind Conference, Sheffield, July 2002.
“The Nature of Delusion”, Birkbeck College London, May 2002, University of East Anglia, February 2003.
“The Complexity of Cognition”, King’s College, May 2003
“Is Innateness a Confused Notion?” Reflections on Innateness Conference, Sheffield, June 2004
“Massive Modularity and the Problem of Flexibility”, Human Behavior and Evolution Society, Berlin, July 2004
“The Notion of Innateness” Moral Sciences Club, Cambridge, October 2004
“Culture, Modularity and Innateness” Language, Nature and Culture Conference, Essen Germany, December 2004
“What’s Wrong With the Extended Mind?” Ohio State University, London University, December 2005
“What Can Brains Tell Us About Moral Philosophy: The Case of Moral Rationalism”, University of Utah 12th Annual Philosophy Department Colloquium on Neuroscience and Moral Psychology, February 2006
“The Extended Mind” Open University, Milton Keynes, February 2006
“What’s Wrong With the Extended Mind?” The Extended Mind II Conference, University of Hertfordshire, July 2006
“The Magical Number Two, Plus or Minus” Dual Processes Conference, Cambridge, July 2006
“Widening the mind: Modularity, evolution and the capacity for culture” St Andrews, September 2006
“Rationality and Psychology” Royal Institute of Philosophy, London, February 2007, Bradford University, April 2007
“The Extended Mind Hypothesis” Cognitive Science, CUNY, October 2007
“On The Modularity of Central Systems”, Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Nov. 2007
“Modularity and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance” at Workshop on Cognitive Perspectives on Mind and Language, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, U.N.A.M., México, D.F. Invitation for May 2008
“Classical Computationalism & The Problems of Cognitive Relevance”, Cognitive Science, OSU, June 2008
“Computation and Cognitive Science” King’s College, Cambridge, July 2008
GRANTS AND AWARDS
2008: Grant-in-Aid Award, OSU
2003-4: AHRB Research Award
1997-8: Excellence Fellowship Rutgers University.
1993-5: Excellence Fellowship Rutgers University.
1992-3: Fulbright Scholarship
1991-2: SERC Postgraduate Award Sussex University.
1987-8: Crabtree Prize in Philosophy University of Leeds.
2008: Graduate Seminar on Cognitive Architecture Ohio State University
2008: Introduction to Philosophy Ohio State University
2008: Philosophy of Mind (400 level) Ohio State University
2007: BA Lectures in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2007: MSc Philosophy of Biology & Cognitive Science University of London
2006: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2006: MSc Core Topics in Philosophy of Mental Disorder University of London
2006: MSc Models of Psychopathology Seminar University of London
2005: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2005: MSc Core Topics in Philosophy of Mental Disorder University of London
2005: MSc Models of Psychopathology Seminar University of London
2005: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind University of London
2004: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2004: MSc Core Topics in Philosophy of Mental Disorder University of London
2003: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind University of London
2003: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2002: MSc Philosophy of Mental Disorder Core Seminar University of London
2002: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind University of London
2001: MSc Philosophy of Mental Disorder Core Seminar University of London
2001: BA Lectures in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2001: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Psychology University of London
2000: MSc Philosophy of Mental Disorder Core Seminar University of London
2000: MA Seminar in the Philosophy of Mind University of London
2000: Rationality and the Social Sciences (400 level) University of Pennsylvania
2000: Philosophy of Mind (200 level) University of Pennsylvania
1999: Graduate Seminar on Rationality University of Pennsylvania
1999: Introduction to Philosophy University of Pennsylvania
1999: Graduate Seminar on Nativism University of Pennsylvania
1998: Philosophy of Mind (400 level) University of Pennsylvania
1998: Introduction to Philosophy University of Pennsylvania
1997: Introduction to Philosophy Rutgers University
1996: Introduction to Philosophy Rutgers University
1996: Introductory Logic Rutgers University
1995: Introductory Logic Rutgers University
1995: Minds, Machines and Persons Rutgers University
1990: Philosophy Tutor Leeds University
Chair of London University Board of Examiners for MA Philosophy, 2005-06, 2006-07
Chair of London University Board of Examiners for BA Philosophy, 2004-05
Chair of MSc in Philosophy of Mental Disorder, King’s College London, 2001-present
Guest reviewer for Cognitive Psychology, Cognition, Mind and Language and British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Synthese, Thinking & Reasoning
Occasional manuscript referee for Oxford University Press and Blackwells
Referee for CogSci 2005, CogSci 2006; Referee for Society for Psychology and Philosophy, 2006, 2007, 2008
Member of User Crews for the Philosophy Compass and the Language and Linguistics Compass, 2008
Evaluator for the Philosophical Gourmet Report 04-06 & 06-08 (Cognitive Science and Mind)
Visiting Research Associate, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social
Sciences, London School of Economics, Summer 1998.
Visiting Lecturer, Philosophy Department, Kings College London, Summer 1999 & Summer 2000.
Philosophy of Science Association
Society for Psychology and Philosophy
Behavioral and Brain Sciences Associate