Chickamauga Battlefield: Brotherton Field, September 19-20, 1863
Photo 1 shows the Brotherton Cabin at the intersection of the La Fayette Road (U.S. 27) and the Dyer Road. The cabin stands near the crest of a low ridge that runs north to south. Despite the elevation afforded by the ridge, Union troops on both days of battle at Chickamauga had trouble defending it. Here's why. . . .
Photo
2 illustrates why the crest of the ridge seemed like a good place to
defend. In this view, looking south from a point near the Brotherton Cabin,
we can see how the top of the ridge (indicated by the line of monuments)
is significantly higher than the ground to the left (east).
Photo
3. But if you were go to the prominent monument in Photo 2 and then
walk down the ridge about 25 paces, you would see a Confederate marker
(circled in the photo). The marker is completely hidden from the top of
the ridge, and illustrates the presence of "dead ground"--an
area that cannot be covered by fire--within a few yards of the Federal
position. That, in combination with the proximity of the woodlands just
across the road, more than offsets the advantage of elevation afforded
by the ridge. On the afternoon of September 19, a Confederate division
overran this position and penetrated several hundred yards beyond before
being repulsed.
Photo
4, taken from a point about 150 yards south of the Brotherton Cabin
and looking north, shows this dead ground more clearly--look at the right
side of the photo. Bear in mind that the roadbed of present-day U.S. 27
has been raised, thereby creating a gully. In 1863 neither the raised roadbed
nor the gully would have been present. The dead ground would have continued
across the road and into the treeline.
Photo
5. On September 20 the Federals again held the ridge. This time, however,
instead of defending the crest, they elected to defend the reverse slope.
Photo 5 shows the view looking east from the September 20 Union
position toward the Brotherton Cabin (left) and the ridgeline, again indicated
by the line of monuments. The distance from the Union position to the crest
of the ridge is approximately 90 yards. The reverse slope tactic has two
advantages here. First, the defenders now have a clear field of fire in
front, with no dead ground to shelter an attacker once he has reached the
crest of the ridge. Second, the defenders now have some shelter from direct
artillery fire. However, holding the reverse slope sacrifices some ability
to observe what is going on in front. The Federals were able to compensate
for this to some extent by placing skirmishers along the crest, but not
enough: Beyond the ridge a very large assault column was organized and
it succeeded in overwhelming this position, too. (It scarcely helped matters
than a mistaken Union order virtually denuded this sector just before the
Confederate attack, but the defenders would have had a rough time of it
in any event.)