Military Reforms, 1899-1914

Military Reforms, 1899-1914

I. Introduction

A. Foundations of Reform

1. Critical question re military policy (esp. after Civil War): how will it be made?

a. Tended to be left up to President and Congress

b. haphazard

2. Efforts to rationalize and improve matters through creation of a War Dept. General Staff (not an Army General Staff).

a. mixed civil-military direction

b. took place against background of perceived world crisis

(1) not solely a response to Spanish-American reforms.

(2) Also war scares with Japan, Mexico, Latin American nations.

3. Staff issue had been rejected in 1870s.

a. Army continued to advocate an institutional line officer voice.

(1) focus on long-range planning for war.

(2) policy should be geared to conclusions of the staff.

b. War Dept. conducted policy in an atmosphere dominated by Congress.

c. Example: F. C. Ainsworth, in charge of Bureau of Pensions and Records (1880s, 1890s)

(1) handled veterans claims

(2) records not rationalized until Ainsworth's tenure--very big job.

(a) reduced time to find records from 6 months to 4 hours

(3) Congress loved him; went from captain to general.

(a) As a result, Ainsworth had political influence disproportionate to his position or expertise.

(b) indicative of policy formation at the time.

d. Prussian general staff remained US officers' model of how it should be done.

4. After 1898, things actually began to happen.

a. mobilization problems in Spanish-American War.

b. Advent of Root, SecWar who replaced the hapless Russell A. Alger.

B. Elihu Root and Reform

1. Root was a conservative Republican and a New York lawyer; no military experience but politically very adept.

2. McKinley initially appointed him on theory that war Dept.'s key need was to administer Cuba, Philippines, Puerto Rico. Therefore lawyerly expertise needed.

a. But Root soon realized that if Army was to be effective in new mission, wide reforms needed.

3. H.C. Corbin (Adj. Gen'l) educated him on military matters, as did ass't adj. gen'l Major William H. Carter.

4. Read (and, in 1904) published Upton's Military Policy of the United States with a glowing introduction of his own.

a. But: more interested in Upton's specific reforms than in his broader, anti-citizen-soldier message.

(1) Knew that was a non-starter.

5. Read up on German General Staff, Dodge Commission reports.

a. G/S idealized in Spencer Wilkinson's The Brain of an Army. Credited German G/S with victories over Danes, Austrians, French. Argued that in modified form it would work in democratic societies too.

b. Critical conclusion: Army could no longer be run as a frontier constabulary.

c. Mission should be to prepare for war.

6. This required changes.

a. Relationship between SecWar and commanding general should be clarified.

b. End of line/staff rivalry--cooperation between line and bureaus and between bureaus.

c. Planning agencies needed to be developed.

d. Staff appointments too rigid; had to be modified.

e. Too much inefficiency and waste--competition between bureaus for goods.

7. Root understood and accepted that changes must be incremental.

a. Root, like Roosevelt, was essentially a progressive--believer in organizational society. Reforms of this nature seemed more natural than had been the case in 1870s.

II. The General Staff

A. The Army War College

1. Established 1900, in response to perceived need for field grade education beyond Fort Leavenworth.

a. Similar to German concept.

2. Root appointed a board chaired by BG William Ludlow, which approved and endorsed the idea.

3. Root created it in February 1900

a. mission: "to consider and report on all questions affecting the welfare of the Army."

b. Also established an Army War College Board composed of five officers who would serve as a sort of interim General Staff.

c. Division of Military Intelligence transferred from AGO; attached to Army War College; upgraded, enlarged.

d. First president (S.B.M. Young) became first Chief of General Staff.

B. Army Act of 1901

1. Comprehensive legislation

2. Root inserts provision that henceforth, staff appointments should be held on a temporary basis by line officers.

a. no longer permanent appointments

b. presumably greater exchange of ideas would result.

c. proved a mixed blessing.

(1) line officers proved rather inept administrators, educationally and temperamentally.

(2) many line officers tried to escape staff duty.

d. principle of constant movement established.

C. General Staff Bill

1. Army not unified on the issue.

2. two points of resistance:

a. Nelson A. Miles--wanted to continue commanding general; rival to SecWar.

(1) Army would pass to eggheads

(2) Civil War vets generally supported Miles

(3) Fears of militarism à la Prussians.

b. Bureau Chiefs generally resisted.

(1) except Corbett

(2) Adjutant general liked it

(3) Quartermaster, Ordnance, etc. didn't like it--wanted to continue autonomy.

3. Personalities also played a role. Theodore Roosevelt tried to get rid of fat, Civil War-era generals.

a. Tried to retire them with a physical readiness test.

b. Miles passed the test unexpectedly well--actually enhanced his reputation.

4. Reformers emphasized the Dodge Commission report, etc. Got support of Schofield, J.H. Wilson, Wesley Merritt.

a. Also advertized it as an economy measure--more centralized, efficient.

5. Ultimately a compromise was arranged.

a. No consolidation of bureaus.

b. Bureau of Pension and Records exempted from General Staff control.

c. General Staff "layered in" atop existing bureau system; authority over bureaus weak.

d. Became law in March 1903.

6. Provisions

a. Chief of Staff (Major General) would serve a limited hitch; office of commanding general would lapse.

b. Chief of Staff would serve as adviser to President and Secretary of War.

(1) duties were to coordinate and supervise--not command.

c. Staff to consist of 45 officers (from Brigadier General to Captain).

(1) 4-year tours.

(a) either in Washington or a major geographical command.

7. Root et al. were willing to accept this, wait for further reforms.

a. Chief of Staff works for SecWar--relationship to bureaus, field commanders still ambiguous.

(1) This was intentional--too politically risky to create strong staff at outset.

(2) But Root figured G/S, C/S would establish primacy in the long run.

D. The Development of the General Staff

1. How it worked out--okay, but only just.

2. Organization

a. 1st Div--Organization, personnel, admin.

b. 2nd Div.--mil. intell.

c. 3rd Div.--Army War College

3. General Staff officers--few were products of Army school system. Acted like AAGs.

a. dealt with almost everything--legitimate general staff functions and a lot of minutiae.

b. bureaus passed on a lot of swill to general staff.

4. 1912 rider--"Manchu law"

a. Drafted by Miles, Ainsworth.

b. Said that if you'd served on General Staff (and away from troops) for 4 yrs., you had to return to field.

(1) tended to cripple G/S just it was sorting itself out.

c. By 1917, G/S had so little clout that Wilson could order them not to do any war planning.

(1) Wilson: neutrality in thought and deed.

(2) SecWar Baker ineffectually tries to explain contingency planning.

(3) Wilson--cut it out; dangerous.

5. Still, a start.

6. Office of Chief of Staff strengthened.

a. Chiefs of Staff tended to be old--first two (Young, Chaffee) were "out to sea".

b. Third--J.F. Bell was hamstrung by bureau chiefs, esp. Ainsworth.

(1) key problem--G/S not supposed to get bogged down in administrivia. But peacetime Army was full of administrivia. Power tended to follow routine into Ainsworth's office.

c. MG Leonard Wood becomes C/S. 1910-1914.

d. Very proactive.

e. worked for Henry Stimson; very able.

(1) learned from Wood.

f. Wood and Stimson were able to force out Ainsworth in 1912.

(1) Ainsworth was the biggest military opponent of reform. Had lots of political clout.

(2) Wood began to deliberately court a fight with him--started horning in on Ainsworth's turf; tried to goad him.

(3) Issue--consolidation of muster, payroll, personnel rolls. Wood considered it a good idea, but its main importance was that it was made to order to antagonize Ainsworth.

(4) Wood also changed procedures re recruiting personnel--another imposition on Ainsworth's turf.

(5) Of course, if Wood were really chief of staff, Ainsworth would have to toe the line.

(6) When Ainsworth responded insubordinately, Wood went to Stimson. Stimson wanted him court-martialed, but Judge Advocate General prevailed on Stimson to simply retire Ainsworth.

(7) Wood wanted to illustrate primacy of C/S. Sacking Ainsworth sent a powerful message.

III. Manpower Reforms

A. Introduction

1. Rejection of larger standing army after 1898.

a. Estimate of 100,000-200,000 required for all tasks.

b. Too costly.

c. Actual force: 60,000-84,000.

(1) Increases substantial but still short of requirement.

2. National Guard looked to to provide manpower.

a. Army would have preferred a Federal reserve.

b. But NGs had too much clout.

c. Measures--1899: NG subsidy raised to $1,000,000 per annum.

B. Militia Act of 1903 (Dick Act)

1. Dick was an Ohio Congressman, National Guard major general; president of National Guard Association.

2. represented views of Guard.

3. Traded Federal supervision of Guard for money and recognition.

a. 4 kinds of NGs.

(1) strikebreakers

(2) ceremonial; social

(3) state duties/militia

b. All these now came under heading of organized militia--which also included all men ages 18-45.

c. 4th variety: Organized militia--those preparing for war.

(1) This variety received Federal support.

(2) Federal government would determined who was organized.

4. Organized militia got

a. free arms

b. increased subsidies

(1) $53 million between 1903-1916.

(2) greater than all militia funding from 1792 onward.

c. 24 drill periods per year; mandatory 5-day summer camp.

d. Followed Federal regulations; NG officers went to RA schools.

e. Subject to presidential 9-month call-up.

f. Service restricted to CONUS

(1) still a thorny problem

5. Strength est. at 100,000. NG for first time had clear legal status at Federal level.

C. Militia Act of 1908

1. Refined 1903 act.

2. Removed time limit, geographical limit to Federal service.

3. NGs would be called up before resort to volunteers.

a. and had to be called up as units, not individual replacements.

4. 1912 crisis

a. Ex-CONUS provisions declared unconstitutional in non-judicial opinion by Attorney General.

(1) Anti-NG regular officers supplied an amicus curae brief.

b. NG reformers began to move to another system.

c. which is why we have an Army reserve.

IV. Conclusion

A. Root one of the most important SecWars ever. Stands with Calhoun, Stanton.

1. Stimson also important--backed Wood, helped C/S, G/S take root in hostile environment.

B. Manpower policy not yet solved, but Dick Act very important. Most important militia act since 1792 and the first real change.

C. Next time: the Navy.

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