I. Introduction

A. For the next week we'll be grappling with the American Civil War--the bloodiest and still the most important military struggle in our history.

B. For the background, concentrate on James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom. Not just the portion from Fort Sumter onward, but the whole thing. Not just the parts that deal with battles and campaigns, but the political, social and economic parts as well.

C. Four lectures on the war.

1. Today: Overview

2. Tomorrow: Manpower, Logistics, Finances

3. The military significance of emancipation

4. Thursday: two topical sub-lectures: one on the naval war, one on the war's last year.

5. Next Monday: two societies at war, North and South.

II. Political Direction

A. Origins

1. Key question: why did war break out in 1861?

a. Traditional explanations of Civil War causation have emphasized--

(1) slavery v. freedom

(2) states' rights v. centralism

(3) agrarian South v. industrial North

(4) irrepressible v. repressible

b. Too involved to attempt a detailed exploration here. In academic circles, the view for the past thirty years has concentrated on the centrality of slavery.

(1) Slavery was the key difference between North and South.

(2) States' rights was a fallback position for Southerners. First sought to protect slavery at the national level. Emphasized states' rights only when this became difficult.

(a) "War Between the States" a postwar coinage.

(3) North was industrializing more rapidly than the South, but North remained overwhelmingly agricultual, esp. in midwest.

(4) "blundering generation" concept assumes that no really serious divisions between North and South existed.

(a) This was not really the case, although it is true that

i) politicians miscalculated badly;

ii) perceptions played a crucial role in the secession crisis.

2. War broke out in 1861 after five key episodes:

a. re-injection of debate over slave expansion after MexWar

b. emergence of an entirely sectional party dedicated to stopping the expansion of slavery

c. Collapse of second party system, chiefly (although not entirely) because of slave debate

d. accession of Republican president in 1860 prompted South Carolina to secede. Others followed.

e. Lincoln chose to meet secession with force.

B. Union Objectives and Strategy, 1861

1. The essential problem facing the Federal government:

a. how to restore Federal authority in the South without losing support in the North.

(1) Border states crucial

(2) Many Dems would fight for Union but not emancipation.

(3) Southern rank and file temporarily alienated; mild policy would cause them to reject CSA.

(4) In any event, Southerners must ultimately become willing to accept a renewed place in the Union.

b. First strategy: 1) avoid attacks on slavery; uphold constitutional rights of Southern civilians as far as possible; 2) attack and discredit Confederate "military oligarchy."

(1) Assumption of brittle support for Confederacy; a few victories would destroy rebellion.

(2) Fear that the longer the Confederacy remained alive, the more legitimacy it would acquire in the minds of Southerners.

2. Obvious parallels with British situation in 1775.

C. Confederate Objectives and Strategy, 1861

1. The Confederacy's aim at the beginning of the war was simple: hold on to the de facto independence already obtained. It did need not to invade the North, nor dictate a peace treaty on the steps of the White House. All it had to do was to continue the struggle long enough for the North to tire of the war and accept the fact of secession.

2. In many respects this aim was little different than that of the American colonies during the Revolution, a struggle still close enough in time to be almost a living memory: Davis's father, after all, had fought in the War for Independence. That struggle had been won almost entirely by attrition. The British had captured the colonies' cities almost at will, traversed American territory as they pleased, and dominated the seas that bathed American shores. But they could not quench the Americans' will to fight, nor could they prevent foreign intervention once the Americans had shown their capacity for sustained resistance.

3. Conceivably the Confederates might have adopted a similar strategy: pin their forces to the defense of no fixed area or city, draw the invaders in, and wear out the Federals by a protracted war of attrition. Instead Davis and his advisers very early settled on a different strategy. They would fight the battle at the frontier; they would not permit deep incursions if they could help it; and they would attempt to hold major concentrations of population and resources. A number of considerations made this the obvious policy.

a. First, the discrepancy in military strength between North and South, although hardly an even match, was far less forbidding than that between the British Empire and the American colonies. A conventional defense along the frontier therefore had greater prospects for success.

b. Secondly, the political pressures within the Confederacy for a conventional defense were also great--every state, every city clamored for Southern troops to protect it.

c. Third, a conventional defense would give the Confederacy greater legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens and in those of the world.

d. Finally, the Confederacy harbored millions of slaves within its borders: blacks formed almost a third of its overall population and formed a majority in many areas. The delicate "peculiar institution" needed the stability of law and order to survive; the incipient threat to this stability represented by the mere presence of a hostile party in the White House had been enough to spur the cotton states to secession. The Confederacy could hardly permit Federal armies to plunge deep into Southern territory if it could possibly help it. Even if formal Federal policy remained one of non-interference with slave labor, an advancing Union army would surely bring about a disruption of slave labor, create a flood of runaways, and perhaps even raise the spectre of a race war of slave against master. The Confederacy, then, had many good reasons to defend itself at the border.

4. Confederate Strategy

a. It would not be a passive defense, either. Davis preferred what he called the "offensive-defensive": Confederate forces would permit a Union thrust to develop, gauge its main axis of advance, wait for an advantageous moment, and then concentrate and counterattack at a time and place of their own choosing.

III. Overview of Conflict

A. Limited War Attempted, 1861-1862

1. From April 1861 through May 1862, the Federal government pursued an essentially conservative approach:

a. secure border areas

b. blockade South; secure enclaves along coast to support this blockade;

c. prepare for a major offensive on Richmond;

d. crack the Columbus-Mills Springs line.

2. During this phase, despite embarrassing setbacks like Bull Run and Ball's Bluff, the Union did reasonably well--esp. from January through May 1862.

a. During that period, the Confederacy lost the Tennessee line, Nashville, New Orleans, and was defeated at Shiloh. McClellan's Army of the Potomac came within a few miles of Richmond.

3. Expectation that capture of Richmond would end rebellion.

B. The Failure of Limited War: Summer 1862

1. The Seven Days destroyed hopes of an early victory. Frustrated, the North responded by calling for an end to the conciliatory policy.

2. Lincoln saw the opportunity to attack slavery--partly as a military necessity, but primarily because he believed that a victory over the South that left slavery intact would be meaningless.

3. The repulse of the Confederate counteroffensive at Antietam gave him the opportunity.

C. The Organized War: 1863

1. During 1863 the South reached the apogee of its military potential. Its war effort became better organized; so did that of the Union.

2. Key events: Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Chattanooga

a. Emergence of Grant, Sherman

D. Toward Total War: 1864-1865

1. March 1864--Grant becomes General in Chief

2. First effectively coordinated strategic plan.

a. destroy rebel armies

b. destroy Southern resources.

3. By spring 1865, this strategy had destroyed Confederate morale as well as much of its military ability to continue the war.

IV. Conclusion

A. Central element in war's origins: slavery

B. Central decision: attack slavery.

1. Ended hope of a compromise peace.

2. Gave North a new source of manpower, strength

3. Transformed nature of war, made it a revolutionary struggle.

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