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Traditionalist Officers with a Jeune Ecole Rationale
"Jeune ecole" means "young school" in French. Historically it applied to naval officers in a number of European countries, e.g., France and Italy, who recognized that their country could not outbuild the Royal (British) Navy and therefore extolled the vulnerability of a battleship navy to emerging technologies like the "automobile torpedo," torpedo boat, and submarine. The U.S. Navy had no "jeune ecole" counterpart, so this a mostly notional category of officers intended to critique Mahan's thesis regarding command of the sea. It is true, however, that until 1890 Admiral David Dixon Porter, a hero of the Civil War, continued to extol the virtues of a traditional commerce-raiding strategy. Porter was greatly impressed by the success of Confederate raiders like the CSS Nashville, shown here burning a Northern merchantman.
Just as Mahan argued that new technology did not alter the eternal truths of naval strategy, an American jeune ecole naval officer might argue that new technology did not alter the successful formula of America's traditional maritime strategy: coastal defense combined with commerce raiding.
Torpedo boats like the U.S.S. Stiletto, shown here in 1900, were fast, inexpensive craft that could evade the shells of larger warships, close the range, and deliver lethal blows using the new self-propelled torpedo.
Submersible vessels like the U.S.S. Holland, shown here in 1900, could protect American shores using the new torpedo--and (as the Germans would demonstrate in 1914-1918) could also function as commerce destroyers.
Mahan's thesis is weak on several grounds, outlined on p. 276 of For the Common Defense. Concentrate on For the Common Defense, pp. 265-270, 274-278; 284-313; 316-326; The Birth of the New Navy; and The Navy and Naval Policy, 1899-1916 (with emphasis on developments ca. 1900). Return to What Kind of Great Power? |
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