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Ballot and Bullet: The "Redemption," 1868-1876
I. Introduction
A. By mid-1868, Republican governments were in operation in every one of the
Confederate states. Within a decade, however, the entire South had been
"redeemed" by conservative Democratic elements, and "home rule"—i.e., rule by
white elites—restored. How did this come about?
B. Republican governments never regarded as legitimate, but rather an occupying
force. Thus white southerners referred to them as "regimes" and historians have
spoken of their "overthrow." Neither term is associated with ordinary electoral
politics.
1. Republican governments saw their task as acquiring legitimacy, which is why
they willingly reenfranchised many ex-Confederates even before the federal
Amnesty Act of 1872.
2. Also had to behave as a legitimate government, observing the norms and legal
restrictions that bind legitimate governments.
C. Their opponents, however, never felt obliged to conduct themselves within the
framework of ordinary electoral politics. Illegitimacy of Republican regimes
meant that any measures were permissible.
D. In 1868 a black speaker at a political meeting in Savannah declared that "a
revolution gave us the right to vote, and it will take a revolution to get it
away from us." Over the next nine years that is precisely what happened, by what
V.P. Henry Wilson described in 1874 as "a Counter-Revolution."
E. This outcome--also described as a "retreat from Reconstruction"--had a number
of causes, but it may usefully be thought of as the product of a "people's
war"--a conflict waged along a variety of fronts--against the continuation of
Republican rule.
F. In a people's war, resistance is carried out "in every field: military,
economic, political and cultural," not only against the enemy but with the goal
of fostering and exploiting a broad base of popular support.
1. Although the phrase has come into vogue relatively recently--one associates
it primarily with the post-1945 "wars of national liberation"--the concept goes
back at least as far as the eighteenth century and arguably much further.
2. The American Revolution was an example of such a war, as were the French
Revolution and the Spanish revolt against Napoleon. Lincoln called the Civil War
"a people's contest," and viewed it, at bottom, as a struggle for the hearts and
minds of Southern civilians.
3. It is most clearly useful in understanding the Reconstruction period, when
conservative Southerners tried to regain control by any means
necessary--sometimes by the ballot, sometimes by the bullet.
G. Few conflicts are struggles for outright survival. In most instances there is
a threshold beyond which one side or the other is unwilling to bear the cost.
Northern civilians and policymakers alike ultimately proved unwilling to bear
the cost of opposing this people's war.
II. The Ku Klux Klan
A. Political violence in the postwar South erupted within a year of Appomattox
and continued even beyond the end of Reconstruction. The closest student of this
subject is George C. Rable (But There Was No Peace, 1984). Rable's conception:
1. New Orleans riot (1866) shows potential efficacy of political violence.
2. KKK (formed 1866, became big in ‘67 and'68) also showed efficacy of pol.
violence; attempted to do three things:
a. undermine state Republican gov't. Ineffective.
b. reassert white control over black labor. Better.
c. enforce white ideas of black subordination.
3. Rable: Despite its "invisible empire" pretensions, KKK really operated at a
very local level; therefore had difficulty mounting a sustained assault on state
gov't. (Eric Foner seems more respectful of KKK effectiveness.)
a. Tended to flourish mainly in counties where racial balance closely divided;
otherwise generalizations are difficult.
4. Extremely active in upcountry SC. In York Co., SC, nearly every white man in
the population joined the Klan. 500 men assaulted the Union county jail in Jan.
1871, lynched 8 black prisoners. Hundreds of whippings and beatings of blacks,
as well as eleven murders. By February 1871 thousands of blacks took to woods at
night to avoid assault.
a. Difficult to fight. Juries refused to convict Klansmen. Some blacks fought
back, but ineffectually. In Blount Co. Alabama, Union army veterans organized an
anti-Klan group that successfully threatened local Klansmen with deadly
reprisal, but this was an isolated success.
B. Enforcement Acts 1870--extension of federal authority. Provisions
1. 1870-1871: Congress enacted three laws intended to enforce the 14th and 15th
Amendments with federal marshals and troops if necessary. The laws made
interference with voting rights a federal offense and defined as a felony any
attempt by one or more persons to deprive another person of civil rights. Third
law, passed April 1871—Ku Klux Klan Act—gave president power to suspend writ of
habeas corpus and send in federal troops to suppress armed resistance to federal
law.
2. So great an extension of power that some Republicans uncomfortable with it,
inc. Lyman Trumbull.
3. Major effort to break KKK in SC. Grant suspended habeas corpus in nine SC
counties. Thousands arrested; 3,000 indicted. Several hundred pled guilty in
exchange for suspended sentences. 2,000 had their charges dropped so Justice
Dept. could concentrate on worst offenders. Most KKK released in exchange for
info about leaders. Leaders tried, imprisoned (all-black juries)
4. Maybe successful--maybe Klan went underground. Tallies of KKK incidents
suggest KKK violence dropped off before crackdown.
III. The "Redemption"
A. The Reconstruction Acts established the basis on which Confederate states
could apply for readmission to the Union. These included writing new
constitutions, ratification by a majority of registered voters, and ratification
of the 14th Amendment. Since Virginia, Texas, and Mississippi had not yet
completed the requirements by 1870, they were required to ratify the 15th
Amendment as well.
B. Once back in the Union, the ordinary course of electoral politics was
presumed to apply, and in states where whites were in a majority, the Republican
governments were turned out fairly rapidly.
1. Of the 6 states with the largest white population, 5 had restored "home rule"
by 1873, and the 6th did so the following year. Of the 4 with a black majority,
3 remained under Republican rule until 1877, 1 until 1876.
C.
1. Political violence in areas with a white majority tended to be minor and
focused mainly on intimidation. Worst incident was in Little Rock, Arkansas,
when rival factions fought for control of the state house after a disputed
gubernatorial election (1874). In this instance, the Democratic faction won.
2. Violence worst in areas in which redemption difficult or impossible without
intimidating African American vote.
3. Could be large-scale. In 1868, for example, 200 political murders in
Arkansas; 1,000 in Louisiana (Small and Singer criteria place 1,000 as threshold
for "war.")
D. Problems with State Republican Defense
1. Too interested in maintaining democratic norms in face of deadly threat.
2. Problem with legitimacy--both because many whites considered Republican
gov'ts alien; also because they seemed unable to maintain order.
3. Vigorous action could backfire. Use of militia in Kirk-Holden War (Gov. Wm.
W. Holden; former Union officer George W. Kirk) in west NC discredited
regime--suspension of local courts; Dems appealed under Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, orig. enacted to protect blacks and white Unionists. Holden had to release
100 captured Klansmen.
4. Sight of blacks organizing for self-defense simply enraged white population.
Colfax Massacre, 1873--after disputed gubernatorial election of 1872, freedmen
in Grant Parish, fearful Dems would seize election, fortified county seat of
Colfax and held it for three weeks under comd. of black veterans and militia
officers. Easter Sunday--whites armed with rifles and small cannon overpowered
them, killed 280 blacks (including 50 after they had surrendered). Two whites
died.
E. The Mississippi Plan
F. Example: Mississipi, 1875: "Carry the election peaceably if we can, forcibly
if we must." Mississippi Plan: Combined features of campaigns that had redeemed
other southern states from Republican rule. First step: persuade 10-15 percent
of whites who still called selves Republicans to switch to Democratic Party,
mostly through economic pressures, social ostracism, and threats that made it
"too damned hot for [us] to stay out. . . . No white man can live in the South
in the future and act with any other than the Democratic Party unless he is
willing and prepared to live a life of social isolation and remain in political
oblivion.
G. Second step: intimidate black voters (55% voter majority). Economic coercion
against sharecroppers and workers kept some away from polls. Violence most
effective. Democratic "rifle clubs" showed up at Republican rallies, provoked
riots, shot down dozens of blacks in ensuing melees.
H. Carpetbagger Gov. Adelbert Ames asked Grant for federal troops. Initially
Grant planned to comply, but Ohio Republicans warned him that if he sent troops
to Mississippi, Dems in Ohio would exploit issue of "bayonet rule" to carry
state in fall elections. US Attorney General told Ames: "The whole public are
tired out with these annual outbreaks in the South, and the great majority are
now ready to condemn any interference on the part of the government. . . .
Preserve the peace by the forces in your own state, and let the country see that
the citizens of Mississippi, who are . . . largely Republican, have the courage
to fight for their rights." Ames tried to organize a loyal state militia, but it
was tough, would have to be mostly black—which he feared might just pour
gasoline on situation. So he concluded: "Let them [the Dems] carry the state,
and let us be at peace and have no more killing."
I. In 5 of state's counties with large black majorities, Republicans polled 12,
7, 4, 2, 0 votes respectively. 30,000 Republican majority in previous election
became Dem majority of 30,000 in election of 1875.
J. Similar campaign in South Carolina. 15,000 whites in "rifle clubs" brazenly
intimidated white and African American Republicans alike, engaged in wholesale
voter fraud. Able to throw presidential electors in doubt and secure election of
former Confederate general Wade Hampton as governor.
IV. Conclusion
A. Postwar South witnessed a campaign of calculated political violence that can
aptly be seen as a form of "people's war."
B. North's changing agenda meant that by mid-1870s, significant portion of
Northern elite disinterested in Reconstruction issues or sympathetic to white
southerners. Other Northerners tired of fooling with Reconstruction and
indifferent to African American rights. Strength of Liberal Republicans made it
difficult for Grant administration to respond strongly even it possessed the
will.
C. Equally challenging to continued Republican rule was the laudable commitment
to democratic process. After a few years, it simply was not in the cards for
former Confederates to remain disfranchised, and so in most Southern states it
was likely that Democrats would again achieve control.
D. But this observation overlooks fact that most white southerners did not share
this commitment to democratic process. Had they done so, Republicans would have
remained in power in states with black majorities and would have remained a
viable political party in the rest.
E. Instead, Redeemers substantially destroyed Republican parties throughout
South. Impossible for whites to remain in party if they expected to play an
effective role in politics. Blacks gradually disfranchised via devices that
exploited black illiteracy; later poll tax, redistricting, grandfather clause,
literacy tests.
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