Thomas Hobbes: Man In a State of Nature Is In A State of War
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| Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) |
From
Leviathan (1660). Chapter XIII Of The Natural Condition Of Mankind As
Concerning Their Felicity And Misery
NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though
there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind
than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and
man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any
benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength
of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with
himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words,
and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules,
called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a native
faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat
else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength. For
prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those
things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such
equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all
men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, than all men
but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with
themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men that howsoever they may
acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet
they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their
own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men
are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater
sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with
his share.
From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our
ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which
is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only)
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that
where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power, if one
plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected
to come prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of
the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again
is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure
himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master
the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough to
endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is
generally allowed. Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in
contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther
than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at
ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they
would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And
by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a
man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in
keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man
looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon
himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as
far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in
quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value
from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First,
competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for
reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's
persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for
trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of
undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred,
their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a
war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only,
or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by
battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time is to be
considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the
nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an
inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not
in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time
there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to
every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other
security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them
withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation,
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building;
no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no
society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death;
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that
Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one
another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the
passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and
seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even
in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and
public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion
he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when
he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests.
Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But
neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man,
are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those
passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they
cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that
shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war
as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there
are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of
America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth
on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish
manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life
there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life
which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate
into a civil war.
But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a
condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of
sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies,
and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and
their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon
the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours,
which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their
subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the
liberty of particular men.
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice,
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no
law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice
and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they
were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses
and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude.
It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no
dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that he
can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition
which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to
come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.