CATCO

Historical Overview of the Postwar U.S.

 

Introduction:  Age of Conformity and Consensus vs Anxiety and Rebellion

 

The postwar era that forms the background to Herb Brown’s political play has been assigned different names by social commentators and historians, including the Age of Conformity, the Age of Consensus, the Age of Anxiety.  The consensus and conformity of the era grounded “The Establishment,” that generation most recently labeled the “Greatest Generation”, and which became the target of so much unrest in the 1960s.  The children of The Establishment, ironically and perhaps as the Establishment would have it, ungratefully, attacked the very values upon which America was built.  The 1950s was a time of paradox, for all of these forces—consensus, conformity, rebellion—existed simultaneously, feeding off of one another.  Changes in the media—movies, radio, and television—underscored the paradoxes of the era.

 

To begin to understand the era, we must remember that several major forces influenced politics and society at the time:  the memory of the Great Depression and World War II; the business-government partnerships that responded to these two crises; the emergence of the Cold War, with the conflict between democratic capitalism and communism replacing the tensions of the 1930s and 1940s between democracies and totalitarian governments; the resulting atomic arms race and second Red Scare/McCarthy era; the unleashing of consumerism (whose expansion in the 1920s had been restrained by the Depression and World War II); and, the unparalleled “Baby Boom” (77 million born between 1946 and 1964).

 

In some ways, as historian William L. O’Neill argues in his book, American High:  The Years of Confidence, 1945-1960 (1986), President Eisenhower’s two terms in the White House underscored Americans’ beliefs in the “American way” and the nation’s power.  Had not the nation weathered the Great Depression and led the free world to victory over three totalitarian governments?  Was not the economy expanding with low inflation even in the face of several recessions and offering more mobility to more Americans than ever before?  Americans had, moreover, appeared to come to grips with the fact that some government programs were necessary to counter the unwanted consequences of capitalism.  Many now accepted that the New Deal and wartime programs that remained actually promoted individual prosperity:  Social Security supplemented retirement savings, protecting against catastrophic losses.  Veterans’ benefits paid back service men and women and created more productive citizens, who would then buy homes and consumer goods.  Government building of infrastructure (e.g., the 1956 Interstate Highway Act) promoted economic expansion.  And the government’s monitoring and tweaking of the macro-economy (Council of Economic Advisers, deficit spending), regulation of the banks and other important industries (transportation and utilities especially), and refereeing between labor and management all contributed to the prosperous times. 

 

In the American society of the 1950s, then, there was a consensus about the “American way.”  But there existed also uncertainties abroad and at home that made Americans anxious and uneasy.  The U.S. did not hold a monopoly over nuclear power.  The government published pamphlets on how to survive an atomic attack and had school children learn how “to duck and cover.”  How powerful was the Soviet Union?  Was it enough for the U.S. to “contain” Soviet expansion?  How much help were the Europeans going to be able to give, given their shattered economies?  Would they want to do so, given their experience with two great wars?  How did the Cold War fit into the wave of independence movements spanning Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East?  Could the U.S. economy support all of these independence movements against Soviet aggression?  Given America’s legacy of anti-colonialism, should the U.S. sponsor the independence movements?  And the Europeans again:  They did not act in concert with the U.S. during the Suez crisis; could they be counted on to help contain communist aggression?  Then there was the Middle East and oil:  How long could the U.S. domestic oil supply remain the “balance wheel” of the global economy?

 

Closer to home, other forces made Americans anxious and uneasy.  How many traitors were there in American government agencies?  Was the threat overblown?  Yes, some traitors had indeed been discovered; but, was the government (and private citizens’ groups) undermining American values in order to save America?  Was that tenable?

 

African Americans, especially in the South but in urban areas as well, were unhappy—and getting angrier—with their place in American society.  They demanded access to economic opportunities (good jobs and schools) and  to public spaces (urban transit systems, restaurants, parks)denied them by Jim Crow laws and racial customs.  They demanded basic civil rights in the society (freedom from violence, right to vote, fair jury selection).  The emergence of the civil rights movement, moreover, underscored the hypocrisy of American foreign policy, which preached political and social freedoms.  And then, later in the decade of the 1950s, some white Americans engaged in “massive resistance” to deny black Americans the changes they were demanding.  Meanwhile, President Eisenhower proved reluctant to take a stand on the issues.

 

Other anxieties plagued Americans:  Were the advertisers on radio and television controlling their purchases, as some social commentators alleged?  Why should what one owned or spent determine one’s status?  Wasn’t America about the lack of status and classes?  Why should we buy cookie cutter houses that looked all the same?  What was the consumer society doing to American individualism? to American frugality? to the Baby Boom generation?

 

The media that brought Americans the consumer society—and politicians like Richard Nixon, Joe McCarthy, and John F. Kennedy—brought them new ideas as well.  Numerous kinds of music were emerging; some of it resurrected older styles (bluegrass, hillbilly) while others challenged commercial styles (behop, jazz, folk).  Hollywood films not only promoted patriotism and American exceptionalism, but also encouraged teenagers to rebel against their parents.  And sex seemed to be rampant throughout the media, from the French-inspired two piece bathing suits to Marilyn Monroe and Jane Mansfield sensually cavorting on the wide screen.  And then there was that guy Elvis gyrating across the television screen, a white guy singing African American gospel and rock ‘n roll.  For the Americans of  The Establishment, the generation that had lived through the Depression and World War II, the world abroad and the nation at home challenged all that they stood for, the American way of peace and prosperity.

 

And while Collier’s, Life, and Time Magazine, along with television shows like Father Knows Best and The Ozzie and Harriet Show, promoted domesticity and female subservience to husbands, did all American women want to follow that ideal?  (Who was really in control in the Arnaz family—Lucy or Desi?)  And what about the men?  Were they really happy working in impersonal bureaucracies on a “career track”?  What was the “corporateness” of American business and government doing to the society?  Was “group think” really healthy for promoting capitalism and democracy?  Social commentators began to question bureaucracy:   The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit (1955); The Organization Man (1956); The Status Seekers (1959).  And, irony of ironies:  At the end of the period, as he bade farewell to the American people, none other than Dwight D. Eisenhower—the epitome of the age of conformity, consensus, and bureaucracy (he was an Army general)—sternly warned the American people against the growing threat of the industrial-military complex.   

 

The rest of this introduction to the historical background of the play focuses on a few key issues—the Cold War defined, the Cold War Abroad, the Red Scare/McCarthy era, Civil Rights, and the Media.  Each includes brief summaries of the issues and Eisenhower’s and Nixon’s position in each.  Material in other areas of the web site include more detail on these and other issues. 

 

The Cold War

The Cold War was the conflict between the forces of democratic capitalism and communism that emerged during and after World War II, lasting until the late 1980s and early 1990s.  At its core, the Cold War pitted the values of the U.S. against the values of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through all forms of diplomacy—ideological debate, economic support for friends, and military aid for friends to be used against foes.  Direct military engagement, the final choice of diplomacy when all else fails, was not a hallmark of this conflict and that is why it is labeled the “cold” war.

 

The Cold War Abroad

In 1947, the Truman Administration decided to engage in what was at the time believed to be a temporary strategy in the Cold War—containment.  The idea was that the U.S. would “contain” the further spread of communism until policy makers could come up with a better strategy.  Containment became established U.S. policy in 1950.

 

President Harry S Truman announced the ideological component of containment in 1947 in his speech on Greece and Turkey.  The U.S., the president declared, was committing itself to defending free peoples around the world whenever they were threatened from without or from within by communist forces.  The lynchpin of the economic component of containment was the Marshall Plan (1947-1948ff), which involved American money and aid going to the devastated nations of Western Europe so that they could rebuild and expand their economies to withstand Soviet aggression.  Other American monies also supported containment (Greece and Turkey, for example).  The workings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (established in 1944 with strong U.S. backing and financial support), were other aspects of the economic component of containment.  These organizations were intended to stabilize the world trading community (IMF) to prevent emergence of the economic nationalism that had brought on the Great Depression and underscored conflicts leading to World War II and to help developing countries (World Bank) bolster their economies along a western, liberal, democratic model so that communism could be contained.

 

The military aspect of the containment policy centered on NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Established in 1949, NATO was based on the notion of collective security—an attack on any member of the organization would be considered an attack on all members.  In effect, of course, it would be the U.S. that would protect the Western European nations if they were attacked by the Soviet Union. 

 

President Eisenhower supported the basic outlines of containment and during the 1952 campaign spoke of adding “liberation” to the policy.  As president, however, he did not support the high costs that came with being the principal agent of the strategy.  He proposed a “New Look” foreign policy that relied on “more bang for the buck.”  This led to some confused policy making.  On the one hand, Eisenhower promoted the idea of “peaceful coexistence” with the USSR; on the other hand, his administration’s rhetoric and actions often undermined that goal.  He and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, employed the threat of “massive retaliation” (using nuclear weapons) to thwart attempts to expand communism.  Eisenhower expanded the notion of collective security through SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, 1954), even as he refused to lend much aid to the French in Indo China (Vietnam)—getting involved in a land war in Southeast Asia, the president believed, was “a silly idea.”  His administration threatened the use of nuclear weapons during 1954-1955 to stop the People’s Republic of China from responding to the aggressive actions of the Nationalist Chinese (Taiwan) on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

 

Eisenhower’s knowledge of Europe’s economic needs and his work as NATO commander lay behind his actions in the Middle East.  He ordered the CIA to stage a coup in Iran in late 1953 to stabilize the political situation there and protect European access to oil reserves.  (A short term success, the action gave rise to the hostage crisis in 1979-1980.)  In 1956 the Suez crisis erupted when France and Great Britain invaded Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal, which Egypt’s socialist leader Abdul Nasser had nationalized.  Eisenhower was furious with the Europeans’ actions (abetted by Israel) and, with help from the Soviet Union, was able to force the Europeans to retreat.  In 1957, he proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine, which extended containment to the Middle East.  In 1958, instability in Lebanon led Eisenhower to send 14,000 U.S. troops to the Beirut airport.  Eisenhower claimed there was evidence of communist activity, but in reality it was a local conflict over Arab nationalism that had brought on the instability and the president knew that; he wanted stability in the Middle East to protect (at that time) the Europeans’ major source of petroleum.

 

Another aspect of Eisenhower’s conflicting foreign policy can be seen in his “atoms for peace” initiative, which he announced in 1953.  Soviet leader Khrushchev did not believe Eisenhower’s sincerity and continued to exert strong influence, and in some cases outright military action (Hungary 1956), over Eastern Europe.  In 1958, however, Eisenhower’s restrained handling of a crisis in Berlin impressed Khrushchev and the latter agreed to a summit in 1960 that would focus on developing a test ban treaty.  Eisenhower, however, continued to direct over-flights of the USSR by the U-2 spy plane and one was shot down, thus ending any chance at holding the summit.  Towards the end of his presidency, moreover, Eisenhower ordered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare plans for an invasion of Cuba, with the goal being liberation of the Cuban people from the communist leader, Fidel Castro.

 

Eisenhower had done much to institutionalize the Cold War, even as he tried to hold down the costs (he reduced the Defense budget from $50 billion to $40 billion), prevent an arms race, and preserve peace.  Thus, by the 1960 presidential campaign, the Cold War abroad had become a prime issue for the Democrats.  Their presidential nominee, John F. Kennedy, claimed that there was a “missile gap” and that the preceding 8 years of Eisenhower-Nixon leadership had allowed that to happen.  In fact, there was no missile gap.

 

The Red Scare/McCarthy Era (1947-1955ff) [see also Historical Chronology, 1944-1961, Other Historical Personalities]

Many politicians employed the Cold War and the fear of communism it engendered to rise to power during this time.  Others, like Eisenhower for a long time, did not know how to respond effectively to the movement.  Some politicians, moreover, worried about a “garrison state” emerging in reaction to the Cold War, a consequence they believed would undermine the very values for which the Americans and the West were battling the communists. 

 

The Second Red Scare began in 1947 when Truman, advised that he would have “to scare the hell out of the American people” if he were to get funding for his containment policies, and fearing that Republicans would label him “soft on communism,” spoke out on the threat of communism abroad—and at home.  He authorized the Federal Employee Loyalty Program (FELP) and ordered the FBI to develop a list of government employees who might be subversive.  Together, the list and FELP violated Americans’ fundamental rights to know their accusers and to be assumed innocent until proven guilty.  Of the nearly 4 million employees and prospective employees investigated during Truman’s presidency, 378 were dismissed or denied employment.  Another 2,000, however, left their government jobs under clouds of suspicion.  No cases of espionage were discovered through FELP investigations.  President Eisenhower revamped the internal security program and, in the process, actually removed more employees than did Truman (2,611 “security risks” fired; another 4,300 resigned).  By the mid-1950s, however, individuals in the press and in all three branches of government—the executive, the judicial, and the legislative—began to expose the internal security programs for violating civil liberties.  Thereafter, steps were taken to control the processes that had trampled Americans’ rights.


 

Meanwhile, in 1947, the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC), which had been instituted in the 1930s but had faced fading support for its actions lately, began hearings investigating the influence of communism in Hollywood.  Hollywood had promoted the war effort through its stars and its movies (including movies supporting the American ally, the Soviet Union).  Tinseltown was central to American culture at mid-century and was big business, both at home and abroad.  Many movie script writers, however, had been members of the Communist Party USA in the 1930s (though most had left after only a short time); other writers and artists connected to Hollywood held political sympathies with communism or values on the “left” of the political spectrum.  But many Hollywood artists were in fact apolitical--at least until HUAC targeted them for investigation, first in 1947.

 

The HUAC hearings of 1947 and later prove embarrassing today.  U.S. congressmen questioned Hollywood stars on why they acted in movies that depicted “Russians smiling” (the government had asked them to!).  Many witnesses were ordered by the congressmen to “name names” of “fellow travelers,” a clear attack on the American notion against “guilt by association.”  Ironically, Richard Nixon’s pursuit of Alger Hiss [see Richard M. Nixon] represented an exception to the rule of HUAC investigations, although the press did not see it that way at the time.

 

Senator Joe McCarthy came late (1950) to understanding how politically helpful it would be to “go after communists.”  His actions—particularly the “big lie” technique in which he claimed to have a certain number of confirmed subversives in his files, only to change the number on subsequent occasions—worked because the press allowed it to work.  Sometimes McCarthy would call a press conference to announce that he would have another press conference shortly when he would have more information.  And the press continued to buy into his antics.  Only when television displayed his behavior in the Army-McCarthy hearings did the American people wake up to his fraudulent behavior.  Finally, with some prodding from the Eisenhower administration behind the scenes, Congress voted to condemn McCarthy’s actions. 

 

Civil Rights

[For an outline of the Civil Rights story, see Historical Chronology, 1944-1961]  

In the 1930s, the New Deal Democratic coalition included African American voters from the North.  By the late 1940s, however, the black vote was not as solidly Democratic as it had been.  Some Republicans (Thomas E. Dewey, Wendell Willkie, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jacob Javits), most from the Northeast, believed the party should do more to court black voters.  The Democrats, meanwhile, added a civil rights plank to their 1948 platform and President Truman ordered final desegregation of all of the nation’s armed services.  This led to the formation of the Dixiecrat party, a group of Southern white Democrats who opposed the national government’s interference in “social affairs.”

 

President Eisenhower was not committed to social equality (nor was President Truman, actually).  While preferring to ignore the civil rights issues if he could, Eisenhower did favor removing Federal laws that supported Jim Crow discrimination.  He was not interested in employing the national government to force desegregation or to force changes in social attitudes.  Still, his Attorney General’s office quietly lent support to preparation of a brief for the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), in which the U.S. Supreme Court declared segregated school systems unconstitutional.  In 1957, the president was persuaded that the actions of the state and local authorities in Little Rock, Arkansas, demanded Federal intervention, and he sent in Federal troops to enforce a school desegregation order.  He said it was his constitutional duty as president to enforce orders of the courts.  Eisenhower preferred consensus, not government force, but he was also, as president, supposed to enforce the law.

 

While vice president, it appeared that Nixon held some sympathies for African Americans.  He was instrumental in working with Senate Majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson to bring about the watered-down Civil Rights Act of 1957.  And at times he seemed to understand better than Eisenhower how important the issue was to … politics.  Indeed, although at first sympathetic to a civil rights program, later in his 1960 presidential campaign Nixon abandoned the northeastern liberal wing of the Republican party to court support from the South.  Ironically, that strategy might have made the difference between defeat and victory in November 1960.  (Of course, Nixon’s “southern strategy” of attracting southern conservative Democrats to vote Republican brought him victory in 1968).

 

The Media

“The media” of the postwar era was undergoing immense changes in large measure because of technological innovation. 

 

Henry Luce, publisher of Time Magazine and Life Magazine, had begun influencing American culture back in the 1920s and 1930s with his mass circulation magazines.  He promoted “personalities as news,” focusing on politicians as well as artists.  Luce was the originator of the “American Century” idea (in a 1941 editorial) and an unabashed supporter of the Nationalist Chinese against the Communist Chinese; much of what Americans knew about China in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s came from Luce publications.

 

With the development of television (the technology had been available in the 1930s) and the transistor (it replaced the cumbersome “vacuum tube”) in the late 1940s, Americans became bombarded with more media images and sounds than ever before.  Competition was fierce.  While radio benefited from the profusion of musical styles, it lost ground to television in the news departments (as did the daily newspapers).  The weekly magazines also suffered from competition among themselves and with television.

 

The 1940 Republican Convention was broadcast on television to an audience of 50,000 in three cities; and while the 1948 and 1952 conventions had more television coverage, it is Richard Nixon’s “Checkers Speech” that is generally regarded as the watershed event that brought politics and campaigning to television.  Ironically, of course, it was the media that undermined Nixon’s campaign for president in 1960:  The television made John F. Kennedy look better.  A majority of those who watched the first debate on television gave Kennedy the win; those who listened to it on radio chose Nixon as the winner.  (See Nixon and the Media)  Given that by then 9 out of 10 American homes had a television, political campaigning would continue to take advantage of the medium.  (See also Dwight D. Eisenhower)