

rationality—independent of individuals in such a way that moral truth can be treated as an object of investigation, as scientific truth is; instead, moral truth is something that instead people constitute or bring into being (“construct”) through the very process of deliberating about it. In Kant’s own theory, this idea is represented in the argument that people understand moral obligation by way of reflection on what principles could be willed as universal law. This approach brings to the foreground the *procedures* by which individuals deliberate about and attempt to determine fundamental moral principles. Rawls’s political theory consists in large part of the characterization of such a procedure to arrive at principles of justice, which, he argues, are best understood not as something individuals discover, but as something they would arrive at on deliberation under certain carefully crafted conditions. The conditions Rawls specifies for this deliberation are also intended to capture important features of Kant’s conception of what people are like as moral and political agents, in particular the distinction between individual persons, deserving of the sort of respect Rawls believes his theory of justice provides.

Rawls’s influence can be seen not only in political theory, but in a resurgence of interest in Kantian foundations for moral and political theorizing generally. Christine Korsgaard (1996) has adapted the constructivist approach in developing her Kantian ethical theory. On her view people recognize that, as reasoning agents, they need reasons to act, and as they assess where such reasons can come from—as they consider possible “sources of normativity”—they realize in the end that they must come from their own rational natures. People take their reasons, Korsgaard argues, from their “identities,” and fundamental to any and all of these identities is their moral identity—their identity as agents acting on reasons. Reasons, Korsgaard argues, are inherently public, in the sense that they must be shareable among agents, so the enterprise of reflecting on how to act itself gives rise to the principles governing one’s conduct.

**See also** Categorical Imperative; Constructivism, Moral; Deontological Ethics; Kant, Immanuel; Rationalism in Ethics.

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## KANTIANISM

See *Neo-Kantianism*

## KAPLAN, DAVID

(1933–)

An American philosopher and logician, David Benjamin Kaplan was born in Los Angeles in 1933 and has spent his career mainly at the University of California, Los Angeles: first as an undergraduate student (AB in Philosophy, 1956; AB in Mathematics, 1957); then as graduate student (PhD in Philosophy, 1964), where he wrote the last dissertation Rudolf Carnap supervised; later as a faculty member, where he became Hans Reichenbach Professor of Scientific Philosophy in 1994.

Kaplan is best known for his work in formal semantics, particularly on the semantics of demonstratives and other indexicals: expressions such as *this*, *that purple Mercedes convertible*, *I*, *you*, *here*, *now*, and *actually*. In *Demonstratives*, Kaplan developed a theoretical framework in which sentences express propositions relative to contexts. The content of an expression (relative to a context *C*) is what it contributes to the propositions

expressed (relative to  $C$ ) by sentences that contain it. The content of an expression determines an intension: a function from circumstances of evaluation to extensions (truth-values for sentences, individuals for singular terms, sets of individuals for predicates). Circumstances include at least possible worlds and perhaps also times. The character of an expression determines a function from contexts to contents.

In this framework, indexicals have variable contents but stable characters. For example, relative to a context  $c$  whose agent is McX,  $I$  has a content  $x$  (which determines a function that maps every circumstance onto McX himself); whereas, relative to a context  $c^*$  whose agent is Wyman,  $I$  has a different content  $y$  (which determines a function that maps every circumstance onto Wyman himself). But, relative to either context,  $I$  has the same character (which determines a function that maps  $c$  onto  $x$  and  $c^*$  onto  $y$ ). Kaplan proposed that the character of an expression is its linguistic meaning and that it is an expression's character that is responsible for its cognitive value: The difference in cognitive value between "His pants are on fire!" and "My pants are on fire!" for example, lies in the difference between the characters of the indexicals *his* and *my*.

Indexicals are directly referential: For any context  $C$ , the content  $o$  of an indexical relative to  $C$  is the entity that the function determined by  $o$  maps every circumstance onto. For example, relative to  $c$ , whose agent is McX, the content of  $I$  is McX himself. Because indexicals are directly referential, a sentence that contains an indexical expresses a singular proposition (relative to a context  $C$ ): a proposition that contains the entity that is the content of that indexical (relative to  $C$ ). For example, relative to  $c$ , whose agent is McX, "I'm right" expresses a proposition that contains McX himself. This proposition can be represented as the ordered pair  $\langle \text{McX}, \text{the property being right} \rangle$ .

One surprising feature of this framework is that it allows one to distinguish logical truth and necessity. For example, "I am here now" is a logical truth in something like the following sense: Relative to any context  $C$ , it expresses a proposition that is true relative to the circumstance of  $C$  (at least provided that the agent of  $C$  is located at the time and place of  $C$  at the circumstance of  $C$ ). But, at least relative to most contexts, the proposition expressed by "I am here now" is not necessary: It is not true relative to every circumstance (likewise for "I exist" and " $\phi$  if and only if actually  $\phi$ ").

Kaplan's philosophical thought has moved from Fregeanism to Russellianism. In his 1964 dissertation,

*Foundations of Intensional Logic*, Kaplan developed a Carnapian model-theoretic semantics for Alonzo Church's Fregean logic of sense and denotation. In "Quantifying In" (1968–1969), Kaplan developed a Fregean account of belief ascriptions and of belief, one that allows quantification into belief ascriptions (as in "There is an  $x$  such that Ralph believes that  $x$  is a spy") under certain circumstances. By *Dthat* (1978) Kaplan had turned away from his early Fregeanism toward a Russellian view on which "John is suspicious," for example, expresses a singular proposition, one that contains John himself and that can be represented as the ordered pair  $\langle \text{John}, \text{the property being suspicious} \rangle$ .

Kaplan went on to become a major proponent of the previously moribund theory of singular propositions. His Russellianism reached its apogee in *Demonstratives* (1989a), where he argued that indexicals are directly referential and, hence, that sentences containing indexicals express singular propositions. Although, in his 1989 *Afterthoughts*, Kaplan admitted to feeling "a resurgence of atavistic Fregeanism," he continued to treat indexicals as directly referential.

After *Demonstratives* and *Afterthoughts*, Kaplan has worked on a number of further topics. In *Words*, he argued that the relation between a word and its occurrences should be thought of as the relation, not between a type and its tokens, but rather between a perduring entity and its temporal parts. He also suggested that it is a word itself that is responsible for its cognitive value: The difference in cognitive value between "Hesperus equals Hesperus" and "Hesperus equals Phosphorus," for example, lies in the difference between the words *Hesperus* and *Phosphorus*. In work on expressives (expressions such as *ouch* and *oops*), Kaplan suggested that one should shift from a semantics that pairs expressions with entities (*meanings*) to a semantics that pairs expressions with rules for their correct use. Kaplan also suggested that characters might best be understood, not as entities, but rather as such rules.

**See also** Logic, History of; Philosophy of Language.

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*Ben Caplan (2005)*

## KAREEV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH (1850–1931)

Nikolai Ivanovich Kareev, the Russian historian and philosopher, was educated at Moscow University, where he took his doctorate in history (1884). During the late 1870s and early 1880s he spent several years studying abroad. Kareev taught modern European history, first at Warsaw University and then at St. Petersburg University. He became a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1910 and an honorary member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1929. His main historical studies were devoted to eighteenth-century France, especially the Revolution of 1789.

Although a moderate in politics, Kareev was deeply influenced by such radical Russian thinkers as Aleksandr Herzen, Dimitrii Pisarev, Pëtr Lavrov, and N. K. Mikhailovskii. Like Lavrov and Mikhailovskii, Kareev was a “semipositivist,” but he was less influenced by either G. W. F. Hegel or Karl Marx than Lavrov had been. His views of history echo Herzen’s “philosophy of chance.” “History,” Kareev declared, “is not a straight line, not a regular design traced out on a mathematical plane, but a living fabric of irregular and sinuous lines, which are intertwined in the most varied and unexpected ways” (*Osnovnye voprosy* [Fundamental problems], Part I, p. 153).

Kareev’s position in ethics, which he called ethical individualism, was even more Kantian than that of Lavrov’s early works. He defended individual autonomy against three dominant anti-individualist tendencies: that which breaks down the self into a series of psychic events (David Hume); that which turns the individual into an expression of the *Zeitgeist* or *Volksggeist* (Hegel); and that which reduces the individual to a product of socioeconomic relations (Marx). From the point of view of the “human dignity and worth of the individual person,” Kareev insisted, “external [sociopolitical] freedom is a necessary condition for the spiritual growth and happi-

ness of all the members of society” (*Mysli*, 2nd ed., 1896, p. 135).

Kareev rejected the “utilitarian attitude toward the person, which treats her as an object,” adding that the “principle of individuality” guarantees the individual’s right “not to be an instrument or means for another” or reduced to the status of an organ of a “social organism” (*ibid.*, p. 138). In attributing absolute value to individuals as such, Kareev said, we take account of both their natural rights and—as Lavrov had stressed—their present potentiality for future moral and intellectual growth. In the name of this absolute value, Kareev condemned not only political assassination and capital punishment but also euthanasia. On this point he came close not only to Immanuel Kant but also to Lev Tolstoy, whose philosophy of history, like those of Hegel and Marx, he had criticized perceptively and in detail.

**See also** Ethics, History of; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Herzen, Aleksandr Ivanovich; Kant, Immanuel; Lavrov, Pëtr Lavrovich; Marx, Karl; Mikhailovskii, Nikolai Konstantinovich; Philosophy of History; Pisarev, Dmitri Ivanovich; Russian Philosophy; Tolstoy, Lev (Leo) Nikolaevich.

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