The second thing requisite is that his reasoning be attended to; for this purpose the imagination must be engaged. Attention is prerequisite to every effect of speaking, and without some gratification in hearing, there will be no attention, at least of any continuance. Those qualities in ideas which principally gratify the fancy, are vivacity, beauty, sublimity, novelty. Nothing contributes more to vivacity than striking resemblances in the imagery, which convey, besides, an additional pleasure of their own.
But there is still a further end to be served by pleasing the imagination, than that of awakening and preserving the attention, however important this purpose alone ought to be accounted. I will not say with a late subtle metaphysician,72that "Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas." That this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to attempt here to evince. 73 Thus much however is indubitable, that belief commonly enlivens our ideas; and that lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But so far are these two from being coincident, that even this connexion between them, though common, is not necessary. Vivacity of ideas is not always accompanied with faith, nor is faith always able to produce vivacity. The ideas raised in my mind by the OEdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles, or the Lear of Shakespeare, are incomparably more lively than those excited by a cold but faithful historiographer. Yet I may give full credit to the languid narrative of the latter, though I believe not a single sentence in those tragedies. If a proof were asked ofthe greater vivacity in the one case than in the other (which, by the way, must be finally determined by consciousness), let these effects serve for arguments. The ideas of the poet give greater pleasure, command closer attention, operate more strongly on the passions, and are longer remembered. If these be not sufficient evidences of greater vivacity, I own I have no apprehension of the meaning which that author affixes to the term. The connexion, however, that generally subsisteth between vivacity and belief will appear less marvellous, if we reflect that there is not so great a difference between argument and illustration as is usually imagined. The same ingenious writer says, concerning moral reasoning, that it is but a kind of comparison. The truth of this assertion any one will easily be convinced of, who considers the preceding observations on that subject.
Where then lies the difference between addressing the judgment and
addressing the fancy? and what hath given rise to the distinction
between ratiocination and imagery? The following observations will
serve for an answer to this query. It is evident, that though the
mind receives a considerable pleasure from the discovery of
resemblance, no pleasure is received when the resemblance is of such
a nature as is familiar to every body. Such are those resemblances
which result from the specific and generic qualities of ordinary
objects. What gives the principal delight to the imagination, is the
exhibition of a strong likeness, which escapes the notice of the
generality of people. The similitude of man to man, eagle to eagle,
sea to sea, or in brief, of one individual to another individual of
the same species, affects not the fancy in the least. What poet would
ever think of comparing a combat between two of his heroes to a
combat between other two? Yet no where else will he find so strong a
resemblance. Indeed, to the faculty of imagination, this resemblance
appears rather under the notion of identity; although it be the
foundation of the strongest reasoning from experience. Again, the
similarity of one species to another of the same genus, as of the
lion to the tiger, of the alder to the oak, though this too be a
considerable fund of argumentation, hardly strikes the fancy more
than the preceding, inasmuch as the generical properties, whereof
every species participates, are also obvious. But if from the
experimental reasoning we descend to the analogical, we may be said
to come upon a common to which reason and fancy have an equal claim.
"A comparison," says Quintilian,74
"hath almost the effect of an example." But what are rhetorical
comparisons, when brought to illustrate any point inculcated on the
hearers,-what are they, I say, but arguments from analogy? In proof
ofthis let us borrow an instance from the forementioned rhetorician,
"Would you be convinced of the necessity of education for the mind,
consider of what importance culture is to the ground: the field
which, cultivated, produceth a plentiful crop of useful fruits, if
neglected, will be overrun with briars and brambles, and other
useless or noxious weeds." 75
It would be no better than trifling to point out the argument couched
in this passage. Now if comparison, which is the chief, hath so great
an influence upon conviction, it is no wonder that all those other
oratorical tropes and figures addressed to the imagination, which are
more or less nearly related to comparison, should derive hence both
life and efficacy.76 Even antithesis implies
comparison. Simile is a comparison in epitome.77
Metaphor is an allegory in miniature. Allegory and prosopopeia are
comparisons conveyed under a particular form.
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